The convergence of monetary policy: Germany and France as an example by Eijffinger, S.C.W.
CBM
CBM ~~ ~,~ ~v~~o5
h ~J ~
R -~~ ~~~~ ~~ ~~o}~o~~~~~~~,
















~~~~~~ i~ i~ i í~ ~~ r~ ~.,,~,m.;t ~ ~ r;`:..~t~
~~ . e i'~, .~
~ l~~i-...':"5:.,1
THE CONVERGENCE OF MONETARY POLICY
- GERMANY AND FRANCE AS AN EXAMPLE
Dr. Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger
FEW 46~Preliminaryversion:
January 1991
THE CONVERGENCE OF MONETARY POLICY
- GERMANY AND FRANCE AS AN EXAMPLE







In July 1978 the European Council of the heads of state and government agreed in
Bremen to the establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS). The EMS
went into operation as of March 13, 1979 and replaced the "snake arrangement" for
the exchange rates of some member states of the European Community. All former
member countries of the European Community -Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom-
decided to participate in the EMS and -except the United Kingdom- its exchange
rate mechanism. Of the more recent members only Spain joined as from June 16,
1989 the EMS- exchange rate mechanism. After prolonged abstinence, just recent-
ly -from October 8, 1990- the United Kingdom entered this mechanism owing to
political motives. The exchange rate mechanism of the EMS has succeeded in
creating "a z8ne of increasing monetary stability", at the same time gradually
relaxing capital controls, and has improved monetary policy coordination between
the central banks of inember countries. However, the fiscal policy coordination
between the Ministers of Finance was lagging behind. As stated in the Delors
Report, the EMS has benefited from the r81e played by the Deutsche mark as an
"anchor" for participants' monetary and intervention policies. '~ This resulted in an
asymmetrical functioning of the EMS, in that respect that Germany focuses on a
target for money growth and the other participants on a target for the exchange rate
of their currency vis-à-vis the D-mark. As a consequence of the Single European
Act, the member states of the Cornmunity confirmed the objective of progressive
realization of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in June 1988 at Hanover. The
European Council decided in June 1989 at Madrid to begin stage one towards EMU
as from July 1, 1990. At the end of last year an intergovernmental conference
started to discuss the composition of stage two and three towards EMU. In June
1990 President P~hl of the Deutsche Bundesbank proposed the possibility of an
two-speed EMU with France, Germany and the Benelux countries moving ahead
and the other countries -including Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom- following
later. 2~ Of course, there was much objection to this proposal by the "following"
countries. Nevertheless, the arguments in support of the two-speed approach are
strong. The budget deficits in Greece, Portugal, Spain and also Italy are (very) high
and persistent and will burden the convergence of monetary policy to a large extent,
Moreover, the lack of wage flexibility and labour mobility within the Community
will undermine the competitiveness, especially in the mentioned countries, and will
require hugh regional and structural funds for financial assistance of these countries.
Both in case of a one-speed approach and a two-speed approach towards EMU, the
convergence of monetary policy between Germany and France will be decisive. The
purpose of this article is to investigate the degree of convergence of monetary policy
which has already been realized in both countries. Firstly, we will discuss the
convergence in the implementation of monetary policy during the eighties: policy
goals, monetary targets, monetary instruments and exchange and money market
policy. Secondly, we will analyse the convergence in the performance of monetary
policy during the last decade: inflation rates, real exchange rates, real capital and
money market rates.3
The conclusion of the article will be that the convergence of monetary poliry
between Germany and France has accelerated since 1986 and reached a high degree
at present. The other side of this convergence is the strong dependence of the
monetary policy in France on that in Germany.
2. Policy goals
The policy goals of the Deutsche Bundesbank are founded legally by the "Gesetz
uber die Deutsche Bundesbank" of July 26, 1957. The task of the Bundesbank is
embedded in section 3 of the Bundesbank Act: 3~
"Die Deutsche Bundesbank regelt mit Hilfe der w~hrungspolitischen Befugnisse, die
ihr nach diesem Gesetz zustehen, den Geldumlauf und die Kreditversorgung der
Wirtschaft mit dem Ziel, die W~hrung zu sichern, und sorgt fur die bankm~ssige
Abwicklung des Zahlungsverkehrs im Inland und mit dem Ausland".
The Act emphasizes the responsibility of the Bundesbank for monetary stability
which means the stability of the value of the D-mark. The central bank should
consult the federal goverment and other economic policy makers on general
economic developments and the r81e of monetary policy. However, the primary task
of the Bundesbank must always be its function as the guardian of the currency. As a
consequence, section 12 of the Act has made the central bank independent of
instructions from the federal goverment in stabilizing both the internal value, as the
external value of the currency. The internal value corresponds with the domestic
price level and may be considered as the main policy goal of the Bundesbank. It
aims at price stability by the control of the growth of the money stock, at present
measured by M3. The external value is regarded by the central bank as the purcha-
sing power of the D-mark vis-à-vis other currencies and thus as the (effective) ~
exchange rate of the D-mark, i.e. the (effective) nominal exchange rate corrected
for inflation differences between Germany and other countries. In Germany the
objective of exchange rate stability has been subordinated to that of domestic price
stability. This implies that the Bundesbank is only concerned with the consequences
of the exchange rate development for the domestic price level.
The poliry goals of the Banque de France are provided for in article 1 and 4 of "~
Statuts de la Banque de France" of January 3, 1973: 4~
"La Banque de France est 1'institution qui, dans le cadre de la politique économique
et financière de la nation, re~oit de 1'État la mission générale de véiller sur la
monnaie ct le crédit...", and "...Elle contribue à la préparation et participe à la mise
en cevre de la politique monétaire arrétée par le Gouvernement et, avec le
concours, dans le cadre dc sa competence, du Conseil National du Crédit..."
Both articles reflect the responsibility of the Banque de France for monetary poliry
and its relation with the government. The central bank is the guardian of the
cunency and credit and functions as the adviser of the government. Nevertheless,
the government determines the economic and financial policy to which the moneta-
ry policy has been subordinated. The Banque de France contributes towards the
preparation and participates in the implementation of monetary policy by the4
government in cooperation with the Conseil National du Crédit. Although the
central bank is not independent of instructions from the government according to
the statutory mandate, its Governor decides in consultation with the Minister of
Finance on the monetary policy in practice. In that respect the Governor focuses on
the stability of the value of the French franc. The Banque de France tries to
stabilize the internal value of the eurrency, corresponding with the domestic price
level, by controlling the growth of monetary aggregates such as M2 and M3.
Stabilizing the external value implies the stability of the ~j~ exchange rate of
the French franc vis-à-vis the D-mark as an "anchor" for monetary stability and may
be considered the rule of conduct for the monetary authorities. In France the
objective of the control of money growth has been subordinated to that exchange
rate stability. Since 1987 the Banque de France aims at stability of the nominal
French franc~D-mark rate by its exchange and money market policy. It is trying to
reduce the difference between the French and German money market rates.
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Of course, on the long term the internal and cxternal objective are in line with each
other. However, on the short term there is always the possibility of conflicting
objectives. By the abolishment of direct credit controls -in France only since 1986-
central banks are entirely committed to indirect credit control for internal stability.
Thus the control of monetary aggregates is implemented by money market policy.
Besides exchange market interventions, central banks use money market policy to
influence exchange rates for external stability, e.g. within the framework of the
EMS-exchange rate mechanism. An increase (decrease) of the domestic money
market rate is expected to result in an appreciation (depreciation) of the own
currency vis-à-vis the other currencies. Therefore, central banks may be confronted5
with conflicts between their internal and external objective and have to give priority
to one of both. In recent years the Bundesbank had chosen for internal stability and
the Banque de France for external stability.
3. Monetary targets
At the end of 1974 the Deutsche Bundesbank announced as the first central bank
publicly a monetary target, i.e. a desired rate of growth for a monetary aggregate on
annual base. The Bundesbank decided to target the central bank money stock
("Zentralbankgeldmenge" or ZBG), a kind of weighted M3, because this aggregate
takes into account the degree of liquidity of the various liquid assets and appears to
be strongly correlated with the total domestic expenditures in practice. 5) Since 1979
the flexibility regarding the external and cyclical circumstances was formally
expressed by the introduction of a target z8ne ("Zielkorridor") for ZBG-growth.
Until 1985 the actual ZBG-growth met the target z6nes on annual base by the
flexible, but restrictive policy of the Bundesbank. Nevertheless, its credibility was
somewhat undermined by the substantial overshooting of the target zdnes at the end
of 1986 and 1987. This resulted from the high growth of currency and banknotes
which have by definition a large share -more than SOo1o- within ZBG and distorted
the monetary development. As from 1988 the Bundesbank turned to a target z8ne
for the "unweighted" aggregate M3 which behaved on the medium term more or less
the same as ZBG and was monitored next to ZBG since 1979. The reasons for this
transition are the false interpretation of ZBG by the public as a monetary base
concept and the higher sensitivity of ZBG for large fluctuations of domestic money
market rates and exchange rates of the D-mark, especially vis-à-vis the US dollar.
This phenomenon can be explained by the strong preference of residents for
currency and banknotes and the currency hoarding of D-marks by non-residents.
Table 2. Monetary tareets and rates of Yrowth,)
Gertnany Fnnce
Yur Z.BC M3 M2~!) M3
1980 5-B (4,8) 1] (9,8)
1981 4-7 (3~) 10 (11,4)
1982 4-7 (6,0) 1244-13Y4(11~)
1983 47 (6,9) 9 (10,2)
19B4 4-6 (4,7) Sbí.634 (7,6)
1985 35 (4,4) 4b (6,9)
1986 31í-SY4 (8,3) 35 (4j)
1987 3-6 (8,2) 4b (4,0) }5 (9,0)
1988 36 (6,8) 46 (3,7)
1989 ca3 (4,6) 4-ó (4,5)
1990 4ó í ) 34í~S'fi ( )
') Actual rates of growth between parentheses
") For 1984 and 1985: M2R - M2 with residents6
Sources:
Deutsche Bundesbank, Gesch~ftsbericht, 198o-89 and Banque de France, Compte
Rendu, 198a89.
The lower sensitivity of M3 for interest and exchange rate fluctuations implies also
a more limited effect of money market policy than in the case of ZBG and thus a
longer policy horizon of the central bank. While the actual M3-growth exceeded the
target z8ne in 1988 only slightly, it deed meet the objectives for 1989 and 1990.
The Banque de France announced in December 1977 for the first time publicly a
target for the growth of aggregate M2 on annual base. 6~ Until 1985 the actual M2-
growth exceeded in most years the target (z8ne) in France which was in the begin-
ning considerably higher than in Germany.
After a temporary switch to a target z6ne for the growth of M2R (M2 with resi-
dents) in 1984 and 1985 respectively M3 in 1986 and 1987, the Banque de France
returned to a target zSne for M2-growth since 1987. The central bank motivated the
announcement of target z8nes not only as benchmarks for the formation of inflatio-
nary expectations, but also by stressing its own responsibility for monetary stability
and the "z8ne franc". ~ According to the view of the Banque de France the objecti-
ve of exchange rate stability alone is not sufficient for a large open economy as
France. The choice of M2 as a target variable is based on the simplicity, clarity and
controllability of this aggregate. It is a familiar concept to the public and consists of
assets which bear no or a fixed interest. On the other hand, the rise of new financial
instruments such as CDs, CPs and "sociétes d'investissement à capital variable"
(SICAV's) induced a transfer of liquidity from M2 to M3 and L This transfer is
empirically confirmed by the contrary development of the income velocities of M2
and M3 as from 1986. Ever since the velocity of M2 increases and that of M3
decreases gradually. 8~ Therefore, it is no surprise that the actual M2-growth develo-
ped from 1987 within or even under its target z8ne, while the actual M3-growth
exceeded its target z8ne in 1987 substantially. Furthermore, by the introduction of a
plan for tax-deductable pension savings ("plan d'épargne populaire" or PEP) in
February 1990 very large amounts were withdrawn from the savings accounts
("comptes sur Livret"). Because of its very long maturity the PEP is not a compo-
nent of M2, M3 or even L. This excavates the meaning of M2 for policy purposes.
As a consequence, the Banque de France may be expected to turn to a broader
monetary aggregate -e.g. M3'- which comprises all liquidity with residents.
4. Monetary instruments
The monetary instruments of the Deutsche Bundesbank can be divided in temporary
and permanent instrumenu. 9~ The temporary instrument ("Feinsteuerung") have a
(very) short policy horizon and are intended to smooth short-term interferences. To
the temporary instruments belong the exchange market interventions, including
swaps, and the important repurchase agreements ("Wertpapierpensiongesch~fte") of
which the rate ("Pensionsatz") has become directive for the interbank money market7
rate in recent years. The permanent instruments ("Grobsteuerung") have a medium
policy horizon and are used to counter longer-term disturbances. Permanent
instruments are the official credit facilities and the cash reserve requirements for
the banks. The official credit facilities can be subdivided in the regular discount
facilities ("Rediskont-Kontingente"), for which the central bank charges the discount
rate ("Diskontsatz"), and the additional Lombard facilities ("Lombardkredite"),
which are daily advances by the central bank against the Lombard rate ("Lombard-
satz"). The discount rate was formerly the under limit for the interbank money
market rate, but nowadays -from February 1985- the Treasury bill rate ("Schat-
zwechsel-Abgabesatz") acts as such. Treasury bills are issued by the federal govern-
ment and sold by the Bundesbank at a rate which is on average a half point higher
than the discount rate. The Lombard rate lies in general 1,5 till 2 points above the
discount rate and may be seen as the upper limit for the interbank money market
rate, in Germany represented by the call money rate ('Tagesgeldsatz").
Before 1976 the cash reserve ratios ("Mindestreserven") were regularly changed by
the Bundesbank, but after that less and less because of the long time which the
banks needed to adjust their cash reserves. However, the cash reserve ratios
remained relatively on a high level because these requirements function as an
"automatical break" for monetary expansion and are therefore indispensable for the
Bundesbank.
Since December 1986 the monetary instruments of the Banque de France consists
of the exchange market policy and the money market policy. 'o~ The exchange
market interventions do not only influence directly the exchange market but also
ind'uectly the money market so far as they are not sterilized by the central bank.
The money market policy comprises of those instruments which operate through the
interbank money market ("marché interbancaire"): the official credit facilities, the
money market operations and the cash reserve requirements of the Banque de
France.
The first official credit facility is the calls for tender ("appels d'offres") with a
maturity till three weeks which the central bank place at the disposal of the banks
according to the expected money market volume. Its rate ("taux des appels d'offres")
acts as a"hard" under limit for the interbank money market rate. The second
official credit facility is the five-to-ten-days repurchase agreements ("pensions de S à
10 jours") which the banks may use daily on their own initiative. Its rate ("taux des
pensions de 5 à 10 jours") is determined by the central bank and can be considered
as a"soft" upper limit for the interbank money market rate, in France also represen-
ted by the call money rate ("taux du jour le jour"). Since the end of 1986 the spread
between both official rates varied from a half to one point. Besides, the Banque de
France can carry out in more specific circumstances money market operations at the
market rate for fine tuning. The money market operations may be subdivided in
direct interventions in the interbank market ("pension à moins de 5 jours") during
one or two days and open-market operations ("concours~reprises de liquidité") by
purchases~sales of Treasury bills against cash, to influence the interbank market
through the open market. While the direct interventions in the interbank market are
very effective in directing the money market rate in the short term, the effectiveness8
of open-market operations is limited because of the small volume of the open
market in France. As from 1985 the cash reserve requirements ("système des
réserves obligatoires") play an important r81e despite that the cash reserve ratios are
internationally quite low. The Banque de France pursues with this instrument three
functions. Firstly, it has to provide for a structural money market deficit to make the
money market operations sufficiently effective. Secondly, the cash reserve have to
act as an "automatical break" on monetary expansion, just like in Germany. Thirdly,
the Banque de France wants to use the cash resefve ratios as an "active" instrument
to control the growth of the monetary aggregates in the short term.
Table 3 The tra~nicsion mechanicm of monetarv poli in
r a a-r?d Francelsince 1986)')
Trtwmission Germaay Fntttt
mechanism (sintt 198fi)
Moneury Of6cial ctedit fttcilities ofïtciN credit facilitiu
instrumentt Money market operations Moeey trarlcet opentions
GsA merve ntioe Casó tesetVe ntioc
Exchutde mattet Erch~ege m~ttel
interventioec intetventions
Maaenry Intetbank money marlta InteiMet moaey mnrkct
indiptom tate nte
(GII tnoney tate) (GH money nte)
Moneary Main utget: M3 Maio targer. Nominal
tar~ets Additional target: Ftettcó ftanc~U-marlc
Real Us dollrr~D-mart erchange nte
exchange nte Aáditioeat at~et:M2
Policy Dovwstic ptice Ievel Dotnestic price levcl
~~ (txfotc 1986 ~~o:
Gro~s national prod~ct)
') For the analysis of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy see:
S.C.W. Eijffinger, Over de beheertbaarheid van de geldhoeveelheid (on the
controllability of the money stock), Amsterdam, 1986, pp. 85-95.
5. F~cha~e a-nd moneXmarket icv
The exchange and money market policy of the Deutsche Bundesbank are aimed at
different targets, while those of the Banque de France have been directed since
1986 on the same target, i.e. stability of the nominal exchange rate of the French
franc vis-à-vis the D-mark.
In Germany the exchange market interventions by the central bank are less frequent
than in France. This can be explained by tbe difference between the Bundesbank9
and the Banque de France regarding their independence from the Minister of
Finance in the field of exchange market policy. At present there is an important
discrepancy between both central banks with respect of the frequency and thus of
the effectiveness of exchange market interventions. As influencing exchange rate
expectations of market participants is empirically the main effect of exchange
market policy nowadays, (very) frequent interventions in this market imply generally
less effective interventions. "~ Furthermore, the short-term objectives of the
exchange market policy in Germany and France differ as a consequence of the
asymmetry within the EMS. While the Bundesbank tries to smooth mostly fluctuati-
ons of the D-mark~U.S. dollar rate, the Banque de France focuses more on the
French franc~D-mark rate. When not abstaining from intervention, the Bundesbank
conducts a policy of "leaning against the wind" to counter disorderly exchange
market conditions. 'Z~ The Banque de France follows the same policy of "leaning
against the wind" and tries to avoid marginal interventions -interventions at the
limits of the EMS-band- to maintain a two-sided-risk. Of course, both central banks
do not sterilize the exchange market interventions by money market operations on
the short run.
At the midst of the seventies the Bundesbank put more emphasis on its money
market policy to control the growth of ZBG and from 1988 of M3 through the
interbank money market rate. A rise of the interbank rate both slows down the
granting of credit by the banks to the private sector and stimulates the demand by
the public for assets outside ZBG and M3. The central bank controls the money
growth indirectly by its money market poliry which means that the policy lag will be
longer than in the case of direct credit controls.
In February 1985 the Bundesbank decided to fine tune the money market more by
its repurchase agreements ("Wertpapierpensiongesch~fte"). The reason for this
change was the big signaling effect of adjustments of both official rates by which the
money market policy had lost its flexibility.
The result was that the interbank money market rate -i.c. the call money rate- since
then less depended on the discount and Lombard rate and more on the "Pension-
satz". From then on the Bundesbank kept the repurchase agreements in normal
circumstances tight, i.e. smaller the expected money market need. Moreover, the
money market participants were more and more focusing on small adjustments of
the "Pensionsatz". So the interbank rate became increasingly volatile in the (very)
short run as a consequence of the greater flexibility of the money market policy.
Despite its volatility the Bundesbank tries to keep the interbank rate between the
Treasury bill rate ("Schatzwechsel-Abgabesatz") and the Lombard rate, thus within a
band of one to one-and-a-half point. While the "Pensionsatz" is very effective with
regard to the interbank rate on the (very) short term, it has no effect on the debit
and credit rates which the banks charge. On the other hand, by its discount and
Lombard rate the Bundesbank influences the interbank rate on the medium term
and thereby also the debit and credit rates of the German banks.
Only in December 1986 the Banque de France decided to switch to completely
market-oriented instruments to stabilize the French franc~D-mark exchange rate, as10
well as to control its monetary aggregates. Once the decision was taken, the money
market policy was developed very quickly and smoothly by the central bank. The
official rates are solely determined by the Governor, after consultation with the
Minister of Finance, and form the band within which the interbank money market
rate fluctuates. Next to this medium term policy, the Governor fixes the amount and
maturity of the calls for tender ("appels d'offres") on the very short term. In case of
a turbulent money market -e.g. the end of a cash reserve period- the Banque de
France may decide to turn to direct interventions in the interbank market ("pensions
à moins de 5 jours") and eventually to open-market operations ("concours~reprises
de liquidité). These money market operations are used for 6ne tuning of the inter-
bank rate from day to day. In recent years the Banque de France is more and more
aloof from influencing the interbank rate within the band of both official rates
because of the unpredictable development of the autonomous factors ("facteurs
autonomes") on the money market, such as the circulation of banknotes, the
international reserves and the balance of the Treasury. According to the central
bank the money market should regulate itself between the official rates as linuts for
the interbank rate. As a consequence of the objective of exchange rate stability
between the French franc and D-mark, the oftïcial rates of the Banque de France
are linked to those of the Bundesbank.
Therefore, the Banque de France needs an additional and (partly) independent
monetary instrument for controlling the money growth in France. The cash reserve
requirements are supposed to function as an partly independent and "active" instru-
ment besides the official rates. Hence, the Banque de France has experimented two
times -in June~July 1987 and May~June 1988- with a contrary policy mix of both the
official rates and the cash reserve ratios. However, these experiments proved to be
no independence between both monetary instruments at all. "~
6. Convergence in Rerformance
After discussing the convergence in the implementation of monetary policy during
the eighties, we will now analyse the convergence in the performance of monetary
poliry between Germany and France. T'his performance can be measured by the
development of four key variables in both countries during the eighties: inflation
rates, real exchange rates, real short-term interest rates (money market rates) and
real longterm interest rates (capital market rates).
The convergence of the German and French inflation rates (Consumer Price Index
or CPI) has been quite remarkable in the period 1980-90. The inflation differential,
i.e. the inflation rate in France minus that in Germany on an annual base, has
declined from over 8alo to less than lqo (see table 4). Of course, this resulted from
the stable development of the nominal exchange rate of the French franc vis-à-vis
the D-mark, in particular since 1986. Moreover, it was supported by the converging
targets and growth rates of the monetary aggregates in Germany and France,
especially since the midst of the eighties (see table 2).11








1980 S~ 17b B,1
1961 6,3 13,3 7,0
1982 5,3 12,0 6,7
i983 3,3 9,8 6~
1984 2,4 7,7 5,3
1985 2,2 5,6 3,6
lver, -0.2 u 2,7
1987 0,2 3,3 3,1
1988 1,3 2,7 1,4
1989 2,8 3~ 0,7
1990 2,7 ~~ 3,4 ~~ 0,7"~
') Annual rates of growth of Consumer Price Index (CPI)
") Estimates by OECD and the European Community.
Sources:
Deutsche Bundesbank, Gesch~ftsbericht, 1980-89; INSEE, Informations Rapides,
1980-89.
As a consequence of the nominal exchange rate stability and the declining inflation
differential, there was also a stable development of the real exchange rate of the
French frane vis-à-vis the D-mark, i.e. the nominal exchange rate corrected for the
inflation differential, as from 1986 (see figure 1). 14~ This reflects that the terms of
trade between Germany and France did not change much since then. However, the
perfonnance of monetary policy in both countries may not be judged by the
development of the inflation differential and the real exchange rate alone because
these variables refer only to the past and the present and not to the future. To
incorporate the expectations of the financial markets, we will turn to the develop-
ment of the real interest rates in the short and long run.
FIGURE 1
After a temporary divergence in 1987 and the first half of 1988, there is again some
gradual convergence of the German and French real short-term interest rates, i.e.
the nominal short-term interest rates corrected for the inflation rates (see figure 2).
The difference of the real money market rates in Germany and France reflects the
exchange rate expectations of the financial markets in the short run. These expecta-
tions are fed by the inflationary and current account expectations in both countries
on the short term. The markets are still expecting some depreciation of the franc
against the D-mark in the short run for which they ask a risk-premuin on the
French money market. Obviously, it takes a long time of stability-oriented monetary
poliry for the Banque de France to earn reputation in the financial markets.12
FIGURE 3
Nevertheless, since the second half of 1988 there is a strong convergence of the
German and French real long-term interest rates, i.e. the nominal long-term interest
rates corrected for the inflation rates (see figure 3). T'he difference of the real
capital market rates in Germany and France reflects the exchange rate expectations
in the long run and thereby the inflationary and current account expectations in
both countries on the long term. Apparently, the markets do not expect any
depreciation of the franc against the D-mark in the long run. Therefore, a prolon-
ged monetary policy by the Banque de France directed on domestic price stability
ultimately pays. However, the monetary policy horizon proves to be rather long.
FIGURE 4
The declining inflation differential and the -since 1986- stable real exchange rate
indicate that the performance of monetary policy in Germany and France has
already converged to a large extent. On the contrary, the present difference between
the real short-term and long-term interest rates suggest that the Banque de France
still has to gain more reputation in the financial markets, but eventually will
succeed. The reverse side of the medal of credibility is the loss of monetary polic~
sovereignity of the Banque de France with respect to the Deutsche Bundesbank. t ~
1fie convergence of monetary policy has brought Germany and France nearer to an
monetary union than many assume. This explains that France wants to accelerate
the evolution towards EMU more than Germany.
7. Conclusion
Regarding the implementation of monetary policy, the convergence between
Germany and France has accelerated since 1986 and reached a high degree at
present. This process was triggered off by the large devaluation of the French franc
against the D-mark in March 1983. After that realigment the French monetary
authorities decided to turn to a restrictive fiscal and monetary policy to restore
domestic price and exchange rate stability. Moreover, the authorities deregulated
and liberalized the financial markets in France as from 1985 in order to intensify
competition between the financial institutions and to bring down the interest rates
eventually. Since 1986 the policy goals of the Bundesbank and the Banque de
France are exactly the same, i.e. the stability of the domestic price level. However,
it should be noticed that the objective of price stability is still not explicitly embed-
ded in "Les Statuts de la Banque de France" or any other act. Legally, the Minister
of Finance could force the Banque de France to stimulate economic activity as he13
did in 1981. Therefore, the test-case for the French government to move towards
EMU is its willingness to make the Banque de France legally independent of its
instructions.
Furthermore, the monetary targets of the Bundesbank and the Banque de France
differ principally by the asymmetrical functioning of the EMS in which the D-mark
plays a pivotal r81e. Whereas the Bundesbank is targeting only an internal objecti-
ve -the growth of M3-, the Banque de France focuses mainly on an external
objective -the nominal exchange rate of the French franc vis-à-vis the D-mark- and,
in addition, tries to control the growth rate of M2. In future, the trade off between
the internal and external objective in France might change as a consequence of the
improvement of the domestic economic and monetary "fundamentals", such as the
current account and the inflation rate. These developments would give the Banque
de France more scope for controlling money growth at the expense of stabilizing the
French franc~D-mark exchange rate. Besides, it is conceivable that the Banque de
France switches to a broader monetary aggregate -e.g. M3~- which comprises all
liquidity with residents. This would fit into a general tendency in the Community to
control broad monetary aggregates and facilitate the ex ante coordination of
monetary poliry by the Committee of Central Bank Governors.
The money market policy both in Germany and in France is directed on the inter-
bank money market rate -i.e. the call money rate- as monetary indicator. For that
purpose the Bundesbank, as well as the Banque de France try to keep the interbank
rate within the band of their official rates and to fine tune the interbank rate by
their money market operations. Nevertheless, there is still an important discrepancy
with respect to the frequency and thus the effectiveness of exchange market
intervention in Germany and France. This results from the diverging independence
between both central banks in the field of exchange market policy. Also, another
test-case for the French government will be its readiness to give the full respon-
sibility for intervention to the Banque de France.
Finally, both in Germany and in France the monetary instruments are converged to
a high degree as a consequence of the process of financial liberalization and
integration in the Community. There is an obvious tendency to fully market-
oriented, indirect instruments, such as:
the official credit facilities (quantitíes and rates) as an "active" instrument on
the short and medium term;
the money market operations (interbank and open market) as an"active"
instrument on the very short term; and
the cash reserve requirements (ratios) as a"passive" instrument, i.e. an "auto-
matical break" on monetary expansion.
Of course, these three instruments are overlapping as an consequence of their
influence through the money market rate. Therefore, the monetary instruments of
central banks, including the Bundesbank and the Banque de France, tend to14
become more limited and less effective. It is the paradox of monetary policy that
the monetary instruments loose their effectiveness in a time in which the monetary
policy is overburdened by the ineffectiveness of fiscal policy as a result of the
relatively high budget de6cits in most countries.15
NOTES
1) Cf. Committee for the study of economic and monetary union (chairman: Mr.
Jacques Delors), Report on economic and monetarX union in the European
Communitv. Luxembourg, April 1989, p. 12.
2) Cf. "Pdhl suggests dual -speed union", Financial Times. June 12, 1990. Mr. Póhl
states: "What I could envisage is a smaller number of countries would start with
a European Central Banking System and other who have not reached the same
degree of convergence are invited for later".
3) Cf. Die Deutsche Bundesbank-Geldoolitischen Aufgaben und Instrumente.
Sonderdrucke der Deutschen Bundesbank, No. 7, Frankfurt-am-Main, April
1985, pp. 103-128.
4) Cf. Banque de France, La Banque de France et la Monnaie. Paris, 1986, pp.
149-157 and W. Eizenga, The BancUle de France and Monetary Policv. SUERF
Papers on Monetary Policy and Financial Systems No. 8, Tilburg, 1990, pp. 1-6.
5) The central bank money stock consists of the sum of currency and banknotes
(C) and the cash reserve requirements for the banks against demand deposits
(D), time deposits (T) and savings deposits (S):
ZBG - C f 0,166D f 0,124T f 0,081S.
Cf. H. Schlesinger, The Setting of Monetary Objectives in Germany, in: P.
Meek (ed.), Central Bank Views on Monetarv TargetinE, New York, 1983, pp.
6-17.
6) The monetary aggregates in France are defined as follows:
M1 - currency t banknotes t checkable demand deposits;
M2 - M1 f non-checkable demand deposits f savings deposits;
M3 - M2 t foreign currency deposits f time deposits
t money market securities hy banks (incl. CDs);
L- M3 f contractual savings t Treasury bills
t money market securities by non-banks (incl. CPs).
7) Cf. J.-P. Patat, Monnaie institutions financières et politi ue monétaire.
Economica, Paris, 1987, pp. 299-308.
8) For the income velocities of M1, M2 and M3 see: Conseil National du Crédit,
Rapport Annuel 1989. Paris, 1990, p. 53.
9) Cf. HJ. Dudler, The Implementation of Monetary Objectives in Germany -
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pp. 19-20 and 25.16
10) Until 1986 the Banque de France used the "encadrement du crédit". a system of
quantitative controls on credit to the private sector. It was abolished because of
its increasing complexity and distortion of competition and its declining
effectiveness on money growth. Cf. Y. Barroux 8c N. Dagognet, Analysis of the
Relationship between Money Stock and Monetary Base: The French Experien-
ce during the period of Quantitative Controls on Credit (1973-1985), in: P.
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~proach. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1990, pp. 117-129.
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tions by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System in the U.S.
dollar-Deutsche Mark exchange market, in: E. Baltensperger 8r. H.W. Sinn
(eds.), x h nge Rate Regimes and Cu-rrencv nion. MacMillan Publishers,
London, 1990.
12) Cf. S.C.W. Eijffinger 8c A.P.D. Gruijters, On the short term objectives of daily
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the U.S. dollar-Deutsche Mark exchange market, Kredit and Kapital. Heft 1~2,
Spring 1991.
13) In June 1987 the official rates were reduced by 1~4 point and next month the
ratio for time deposits was raised with one point. Both official rates were also
reduced by 1~4 point in May 1988, while next month the ratios for savings and
time deposits were raised with 1,5 respectively 0,5 point.
14) In 1986 foreign exchange controls in France were considerably eased to some
not onerous measures and quantitative controls on credit were removed: A.
Icard, FxchanPP Rates and Interest Rates inside the EM~-The French Eacve-
rience. Presentation to the IMF Visitors Center, Washington, April 18, 1990.
15) For an thorough analysis of the consequences of economic and monetary
integration for monetary policy see: R. Raymond, The Conduct of Monetary
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